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COMMENTS
MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS: UNFAIR AND
UNNECESSARY
by David R. Miller
More legal disputes are resolved out of court today than ever before.
Unless this trend is encouraged, the presently sluggish pace of our judicial
process will slow to an intolerable level. Nevertheless, a settlement device
used in multiparty litigation, known as the Mary Carter agreement,' has
surfaced in recent years, and cannot be blindly accepted. Under the typi-
cal Mary Carter agreement the plaintiff releases his cause of action against
a joint tortfeasor in return for the settling joint tortfeasor's continued par-
ticipation in the trial. The plaintiff also promises to pay the settling tort-
feasor a portion of the recovery received from the nonsettling tortfeasor.
The settling tortfeasor thus represents himself to be a defendant whose
financial interest is adverse to the plaintiff, while in fact he has a vested
financial interest in the success of the plaintiffs cause of action against the
nonsettling defendant. Although Mary Carter agreements have been used
in multiparty litigation for several years,2 this subject was addressed by a
Texas appellate court for the first time in 1977 in General Motors Corp. v.
Simmons. ' In Simmons the Texas Supreme Court noted that these agree-
ments tend "to undermine the adversary nature and integrity of the pro-
ceedings against the remaining defendant."4 The court, in accord with
most jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of Mary Carter agree-
ments, held that the district court erred in refusing to admit the Mary
Carter agreement into evidence.
1. The term "Mary Carter agreement" originated in Florida, where there has been an
abundance of litigation involving these agreements. In Maule Indus. Inc. v. Rountree, 264
So. 2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), rev'd, 284 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973), the Florida District
Court of Appeals stated:
The term arises from the agreement popularized by the case of Booth v. Mary
Carter Paint Co., Fla. App. 1967, 202 So. 2d 8, and now appears to be used
rather generally to apply to any agreement between the plaintiff and some
(but less than all) defendants whereby the parties place limitations on the fi-
nancial responsibility of the agreeing defendants, the amount of which is vari-
able and usually in some inverse ratio to the amount of recovery which the
plaintiff is able to make against the nonagreeing defendant or defendants.
264 So. 2d at 446 n. 1.
2. The Indiana Supreme Court noted in American Transp. Co. v. Central Ind. Ry., 255
Ind. 319, 264 N.E.2d 64, 67 (1970), that Mary Carter agreements have "been used by the
railroads for at least thirty years to induce injured parties to proceed against the railroads'
joint tort-feasor."
3. 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
4. Id. at 858.
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This Comment demonstrates that admitting agreements of this nature
into evidence, even with the precautionary measures that the Texas
Supreme Court omitted from their decision,' will not prevent the prejudi-
cial effect a Mary Carter agreement has on the nonsettling defendant.
Whatever benefit a Mary Carter agreement is to the orderly administration
of justice, this advantage is overwhelmingly outweighed by the inherent
injustice the typical agreement imposes on the nonsettling defendant.
This Comment concludes that the most satisfactory method of dealing
with such agreements is to declare them illegal and unenforceable.
I. BACKGROUND CONCEPTS: JOINT TORTFEASORS, RELEASES,
COVENANTS NOT TO SUE, AND COVENANTS NOT TO EXECUTE
Joint Tortfeasors. Under a Mary Carter agreement the plaintiff settles his
claim against some, but not all, joint tortfeasors while expressly retaining
his cause of action against the remaining joint tortfeasors. Such an agree-
ment is only practical when there is joint liability because the plaintiffs
major objective in entering a Mary Carter agreement is the solicitation of
assistance in his cause against the remaining defendants.
At early English common law, two or more persons became joint
tortfeasors only when they participated in a concerted action pursuant to a
common scheme which caused injury to the plaintiff.6 In a "true" joint
tort, each tortfeasor could be joined in the same cause of action and was
liable for the entire damage.7 In the absence of unity or common design,
acts of independent tortfeasors at common law could not culminate in a
joint tort, even though such acts produced a single, indivisible injury.'
Such "concurrent" tortfeasors had to be sued separately.9 Initially, Amer-
ican courts followed the common law doctrine, but the liberalization of the
American procedural system permitted joinder of "concurrent" tortfeasors
in one cause of action.' ° In permitting joinder of "concurrent" joint
tortfeasors, the term "joint tortfeasor" was applied indiscriminately by the
courts to "concurrent" joint tortfeasors and to "true" joint tortfeasors. "
Consequently, every American jurisdiction now recognizes that when two
or more persons concur in producing a single injury, those persons are
5. See notes 109-14 infra and accompanying text.
6. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 291 (4th ed. 1971). See also Dial v. Crosby
County, 96 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, no writ); Houser v. Harris, 44
S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1931, no writ).
7. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 291. The jury was not permitted to apportion dam-
ages, although the plaintiff was only entitled to a single recovery.
8. Id. at 297. See also Phelps v. Drainage Dist. No. 1, 216 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Houser v. Harris, 44 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 193 1, no writ) (although each tortfeasor acts independently, the tort is
"joint" by common law standards when there exists a "community of responsibility" toward
the plaintiff and concurrent wrongs produced the injury).
9. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 293; Kennedy, Settlement Devices with Joint
Tort/easors, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 762, 763 (1973).
10. W. PROSSER, supranote 6, at 297; Kennedy, supra note 9, at 764.
II. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 294; Comment, Release of Joint Tort-Feasors in Texas,
36 TEXAS L. REV. 55, 55-56 (1957).
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jointly and severally liable, notwithstanding the absence of concerted ac-
tion.t2
Releases. At common law release of one true joint tortfeasor released all
other joint tortfeasors since the tortfeasors' united acts were regarded as
one indivisible cause of action.13 A release or judgment against one joint
tortfeasor extinguished the entire cause of action. 4 This rule of "unitary
discharge" often defeated the releasing party's intention to preserve the
cause of action against the unreleased tortfeasor. t5 This perversion of the
releasing party's intent to achieve a partial settlement and the court's treat-
ment of concurrent tortfeasors as true joint tortfeasors lead to dissatisfac-
tion and criticism,' 6 and ultimately to judicial modification.' 7
Covenants Not to Sue and Covenants Not to Execute. The most widely
used method of circumventing the harshness of the unitary discharge rule
is the covenant not to sue. Rather than surrender the entire cause of ac-
tion through a release, the parties enter a contract whereby the injured
party agrees not to enforce his cause of action against one of the
tortfeasors 8 If the instrument is phrased in the language of a release, but
reserves the right to sue another tortfeasor, most jurisdictions construe the
agreement as a convenant not to sue,' 9 and the right to bring a cause of
action against other tortfeasors is preserved. 20  A covenant not to execute
12. Comment, supra note 11 at 57; see Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co.,
151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
13. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 301 (release is a surrender of a cause of action which
may be gratuitous or given for consideration); Comment, Torts-Joint and Several Liability,
Releases, Covenants Not to Sue, Covenants Not to Levy or Execute and Reduction of Debts
Pro Tanto, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 466, 470 (1951).
14. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 301.
15. Id. at 302; Comment, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 486, 487 n.12
(1966).
16. See, e.g., McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943), in which Justice Rut-
ledge stated:
Compromise is stifled, first, by inviting all to wait for others to settle and,
second, because claimants cannot accept less than full indemnity from one
when doing that discharges all. Many, not knowing this, accept less only to
find later they have walked into a trap. The rule shortchanges the claimant or
overcharges the person who settles, as the recurring volume and pattern of
litigation show. Finally, it is anomalous in legal theory, giving tortfeasors an
advantage wholly inconsistent with the nature of their liability.
Id. at 662.
17. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 302-03; Comment, supra note 11, at 56-58; Comment,
supra note 13, at 470.
18. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 303. The distinction between a release and a covenant
not to sue is entirely artificial. Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P.2d 783
(1945).
19. Only two states, Washington and Virginia, follow the common law doctrine that
release of one joint tortfeasor releases all joint tortfeasors, notwithstanding the fact that the
document is drawn in the form of a covenent not to sue. See Bland v. Warwickshire Corp.,
160 Va. 131, 168 S.E. 443 (1933); Haney v. Cheatham, 8 Wash. 2d 310, 111 P.2d 1003 (1941).
20. Comment, supra note 11, at 56-58. This interpretation has been appropriately la-
beled "judicial fudging." In early phases of "judicial fudging," the courts construed the
terms of the release according to the general rules of contract interpretation. The primary
19781
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JOURNAL
has the same effect as a covenant not to sue. 2' The major distinction is
that a covenant not to execute is entered after the proceedings have begun,
while a covenant not to sue is generally used as a pretrial device.22
The Texas Approach. Texas no longer differentiates between releases
and covenants not to sue.23 Under the more pragmatic Texas approach, a
party is not relieved of liability unless he is named in the releasing instru-
ment.24  Thus, a release of one party releases only the tortfeasor who
makes the partial settlement unless the settlement fully satisfies the injured
party.
25
II. THE MARY CARTER AGREEMENT
A. Elements
As in an ordinary covenant not to sue, a plaintiff who is a party to a
Mary Carter or loan receipt 26 agreement releases his cause of action
against the settling defendant. A Mary Carter agreement, 27 however, con-
focus was on the intent of the parties at the time the release was executed. Notably, the
Texas courts were very liberal in their construction of the parties' intent.
21. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 771.
22. Id.; Comment, Blending Mary Carter's Colors. A Tainted Covenant, 12 GONZ. L.
REV. 266, 268 n.13 (1977).
23. McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1971).
24. Id. at 196.
25. See Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413, 423 (1973), in
which Professor Prosser first advocated the approach now adopted in Texas.
26. The modern day loan receipt agreement is distinguishable from a Mary Carter
agreement only in form, not substance. Such an agreement, in its simplest form, provides
that one defendant will advance an interest free loan to the plaintiff in return for a covenant
not to sue or a covenant not to execute. The nonsettling defendant, nonetheless, remains a
party to the litigation. The plaintiff then agrees to pursue his claim against the nonagreeing
defendant. The plaintiff also agrees to repay the loan according to a formula based on the
amount recovered from the nonagreeing defendant. See Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co.,
355 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. App. 1976). See also Note, Loan Agreements as Settlement
Devices, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 792 (1976).
Historically, the loan receipt agreement originated in marine insurance cases and did not
involve a settlement agreement. Such an agreement would arise in the following manner.
Goods owned by an insured are lost or damaged in the process of shipping. The insurer,
rather than pay the insured's claim and seek subrogation or indemnity from the carrier,
enters a loan receipt agreement with the plaintiff-insured. The agreement provides: (1) the
amount paid is an interest free loan, repayable only upon recovery by the insured from the
carrier or any other person responsible; (2) the insured's claim against the carrier is pledged
as security on the loan; and (3) the insured must institute an action or permit the insurer to
institute an action in the insured's name for recovery of the loss. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 42
(1967); Comment, Loan Agreement." A Settlement Device That Deserves Close Scrutiny, 10
VAL. L. REv. 231 (1976). See also Note, supra, at 796 n. 12; Comment, supra note 22, at 268
n.11. This type of agreement was approved by the United States Supreme Court in Lucken-
bach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139 (1918).
In addition to being called Mary Carter or loan receipt agreements, settlements containing
the requisites discussed in notes 27-47 infra and accompanying text have been labeled "Gal-
lagher" agreements, Mustang Equip., Inc. v. Welch, 115 Ariz. 206, 564 P.2d 895 (1977), and
"guaranty" agreements, Bedford School Dist. v. Caron Constr. Co., 116 N.H. 300, 367 A.2d
1051 (1976).
27. The agreement in the original Mary Carter case contained the following elements:
(1) the plaintiff agreed not to execute a judgment against the settling defendant in return
for the settling defendant's continued presence in the trial; (2) the plaintiff was guaranteed
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tains two conditions not found in a typical covenant not to sue. 28  First,
and most important, is the "incentive clause," or as one writer has labeled
it, the "guarantee clause."'29 This clause provides that the settling defend-
ant will pay or agree to pay the plaintiff a stated sum in return for either a
covenant not to sue,30 a covenant not to execute,3 ' or a covenant to dismiss
the settling defendant at the close of the evidence. 32  The plaintiff also
promises to pay or credit to the settling defendant a sum of money based
on the amount of the plaintiff's recovery from the nonsettling defendant.33
The distinguishing feature of a Mary Carter agreement is that the plain-
tiff's cause of action against the settling defendant is extinguished, yet the
amount the settling defendant ultimately pays the plaintiff is determined
by the success of the plaintiffs action against the nonsettling defendant.
Although the plaintiff is guaranteed a certain sum, this clause is better
described as an incentive clause because the settling defendant is en-
couraged to aid the plaintiff in obtaining a judgment against the remaining
defendant. More importantly, the incentive clause encourages the settling
defendant to assist the plaintiff in recovering a large judgment. Courts
have often stated that in instances of alleged joint and several liability de-
fendants occasionally maintain positions adverse to one another on the
issue of liability.34 But never, in the absence of some form of a Mary
$12,500 if a take nothing judgment was entered; (3) if a judgment was entered against all
defendants for less than $37,500, the settling defendant was to pay the difference up to
$12,500; and (4) the agreement was to remain secret. Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202
So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
28. For examples of Mary Carter agreements, see City of Tucson v. Gallagher, 14 Ariz.
App. 385, 483 P.2d 798 (1971), vacated, 108 Ariz. 140, 493 P.2d 1197 (1972); Lum v. Stinnett,
87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971); General Motors Co. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.
1977); Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., 355 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. App. 1976).
29. Comment, The Mary Carter Agreement-Solving the Problem of Collusive Settle-
ments in Joint Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1974).
30. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
31. See, e.g., Ponderosa Timber & Clearing Co. v. Emrich, 86 Nev. 625, 472 P.2d 358
(1970). In states that do not permit contribution the agreements are usually in the form of a
covenant not to execute or covenant not to enforce judgment.
32. See, e.g., Daniel v. Penrod Drilling Co., 393 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. La. 1975).
33. See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977), in which the
plaintiff agreed to pay the settling defendant 50% of the first $400,000 recovered from the
nonsettling defendant. All recovery above $400,000 went solely to the plaintiff. The
amount that a settling defendant is able to recoup from the plaintiffs recovery from a non-
settling defendant is generally the amount that a settling defendant originally "fronts" the
plaintiff. Although the published opinion of the Texas Supreme Court in Simmons states
that the amount paid for the covenant not to sue was unknown, a brief submitted on motion
for rehearing clearly shows that settling defendant's optimum recovery was equal to the
amount advanced to the plaintiff, $200,000. Brief for Appellee on Rehearing at 12, General
Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
But see Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 358 (W.D. La. 1976), in which
apparently no limit was placed on the settling defendant's optimum recovery.
34. In Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Otis, 145 Ind. App. 159, 250 N.E.2d 378 (1969),
the court stated:
[F]rom the earliest stages of this case [the defendants] were engaged in an
extensive effort to blame each other. Such conduct is not foreign to litigation
defended by more than one party. There is no legal requirement that co-
defendants must be friendly in defending a lawsuit. The realities of litigation
clearly indicate that co-defendants are frequently unfriendly.
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Carter agreement, will a defendant encourage a jury to award a large judg-
ment.35
The second important way in which the typical Mary Carter agreement
differs from the ordinary covenant not to sue is the continuing and active
participation by the settling defendant in the trial of the case.36 This con-
dition is often expressly required by the agreement. 37  The incentive
clause, however, aligns the settling defendant's interests with the plaintiffs
cause so that enforcement by contract of his presence or allegiance is not
necessary. Moreover, the settling defendant's continued presence as a de-
fendant and an apparent adversary to the plaintiff permits him to advocate
the plaintiffs cause in hope of reaping the benefits provided by the incen-
tive clause. The presentation of the case, therefore, may be so warped by
collusion, lack of adversarial vigor, and numerous other factors38 that the
nonsettling defendant is denied a fair trial.
Some commentators contend that Mary Carter agreements must also
contain mutual promises to conceal the agreement from the court, the op-
posing attorneys, and the jury.39 Although this provision may be present
in some agreements, neither the clause nor the satisfaction of the enumer-
ated requisites is necessary in order to prejudice the nonsettling defendant.
Concealing a Mary Carter agreement from opposing counsel and the court
may increase the prejudicial effect of such an agreement,4" but the real
prejudice is caused by the jury's inability to evaluate the testimony of wit-
nesses and position of counsel in light of the incentive clause. Complete
candor with the court and opposing counsel will not eradicate the damage
caused by the false appearance of an adversary proceeding. 41 Revealing
the agreement to the jury, however, is in itself so prejudicial that it will
deny the litigants a fair trial. 2
250 N.E. 2d at 393.
35. See notes 88-92 infra.
36. See Comment, supra note 29, at 1396; Comment, supra note 22, at 267.
37. See, e.g., Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 284 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973).
38. See notes 67-94 infra and accompanying text.
39. See Comment, supra note 22, at 267; Comment, supra note 29, at 1396.
40. Surprise to the nonsettling defendant is probably the most detrimental element of
concealment. Although there are instances when a Mary Carter agreement has not been
revealed to the court or opposing counsel until after the trial has been concluded, see, e.g.,
Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 358 (W.D. La. 1976), it seems highly unlikely
that the nonsettling defendant would be unaware that a Mary Carter agreement has been
made. Realistically, the position of the agreeing parties would change dramatically during
discovery or the trial, depending on when the agreement was made.
41. In Illinois the parties to a Mary Carter agreement are under an affirmative duty to
disclose the existence of the agreement to the court and opposing counsel. Gatto v. Wal-
green Drug Co., 61111. 2d 513, 337 N.E.2d 23 (1975). This duty exists even in the absence of
a discovery request to produce a settlement agreement. See Note, supra note 26, at 797-98.
Oregon has enacted legislation forcing unsolicited disclosure of a settlement agreement.
ORE. REv. STAT. § 18.455 (1977) states in part:
When a convenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith
to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury. . . the claim-
ant shall give notice of all of the terms of the covenant to all persons against
whom he makes claims.
42. See notes 109-18 infra and accompanying text.
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Other provisions may be included in a Mary Carter agreement. For in-
stance, the plaintiff may promise to prosecute his claim diligently against
the nonsettling defendant.43 The plaintiff may also be precluded from
settling with the remaining defendant for less than a stipulated sum or
without the consent of the settling defendant." The settling defendant
may give the plaintiff additional consideration other than money in return
for entering the agreement.45 As one court has noted: "[T]he number of
variations of the so-called 'Mary Carter Agreement' is limited only by the
ingenuity of counsel and the willingness of the parties to sign . . . . [W]e
therefore feel that we can neither condone nor condemn such agreements
generically."46 One commentator has concluded that formulating a pre-
cise definition of Mary Carter agreements is so difficult that per se illegal-
ity is not "a desirable solution to the problems caused by Mary Carter
Agreements."47 This reasoning is unsound because a definition of a Mary
Carter agreement is formable. First, the settling defendant must actually
participate in the trial so he is able to aid the plaintiff in his claim against
the remaining defendant. Secondly, the settling defendant must benefit
financially from a judgment for the plaintiff against the nonsettling de-
fendant. This financial benefit may be a recovery of an actual dollar
amount or a forebearance by the plaintiff to collect an amount of money
due from the settling defendant.
B. The Law Favors Settlement, but Not Mary Carter Agreements
Advocates of Mary Carter agreements rely heavily on the rhetoric that
"the law favors settlement" to strengthen their position.48 While the law
does encourage out of court settlement of disputes,49 a Mary Carter agree-
ment only partially resolves the dispute. Consequently, the salutory ef-
fects of settlement, such as relief to the overcongested court dockets 50 and
43. See, e.g., Bedford School Dist. v. Caron Constr. Co., 116 N.H. 300, 367 A.2d 1051,
1052 (1976); Grillo v. Burkes Paint Co., 275 Ore. 445, 551 P.2d 449 (1976).
44. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
45. An interesting sequence of events in Mustang Equip., Inc. v. Welch, 115 Ariz. 206,
564 P.2d 895 (1977), lead to a different sort of consideration. The plaintiff brought an
action against Mountain States Telephone after his car was rear-ended by a Mountain States
truck. Mountain States, after investigating the accident, found evidence that Mustang
Equipment might be responsible in some way for the accident. Mountain States ultimately
traded an engineer's report to the plaintiff in return for a covenant not to execute. The
settling defendant in Daniel v. Penrod Drilling Co., 393 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. La. 1975),
covenanted not to maintain an aggressive or destructive posture to the plaintiffs case or its
witnesses. The settling defendant in Daniel also made a more common, but unreported,
concession to the plaintiff. He used his peremptory strikes as directed by the plaintiff.
46. Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445, 447 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 284 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973).
47. Comment, supra note 29, at 1409.
48. See generally Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973);
Northern Ind. Pub. Ser. Co. v. Otis, 145 Ind. App. 159, 250 N.E.2d 378 (1969); Michael,
Mary Carter Agreements in Illinois, 64 ILL. B.J. 514 (1976); Comment, supra note 29, at
1393.
49. See Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964); Ross v. Seip,
154 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1941, no writ).
50. See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 774; Comment, supra note 29, at 1398.
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simplification of complex litigation, 1 are not achieved. A Mary Carter
agreement by its very nature insists upon continued litigation after the
agreement is made. The plaintiff will continue to pursue his action
against the nonsettling defendant and in some instances may be obligated
to do S0.52 The agreement, not being a final resolution among all parties,
does not preclude further litigation. 3 Partial settlement in states such as
Texas that permit contribution54 does not simplify complex litigation.
The settling defendant may be joined as a third party defendant, and his
liability will still be at issue.5
The existence of a Mary Carter agreement also inhibits the possibility of
settlement with the remaining defendant. Since the settling defendant may
escape liability completely by entering a Mary Carter agreement, he pays
more to the plaintiff than he would under an ordinary covenant not to
sue. 6 The plaintiff thus obtains the best of all possible worlds: he is guar-
anteed an inordinately high pretrial recovery without releasing his cause of
action against the nonsettling defendant, and more importantly, he secures
the active participation and support of the settling defendant. Once the
plaintiff attains this bargaining position, his settlement with the remaining
defendant is less likely. Suppose, for example, the agreement stipulated
that if the jury awarded less than $20,000, the settling defendant would pay
the difference, up to a total of $20,000, and if the jury awarded $20,000 or
more, the settling defendant would not contribute. 7 In this situation, the
plaintiff probably would not accept a $25,000 settlement from the remain-
ing defendant since he would receive only a net increase of $5,000 over the
guaranteed $20,000. The remaining defendant will be unable to make an
appealing settlement offer since the settling defendant's guarantee is prob-
ably inflated. A Mary Carter agreement thus will not encourage settle-
ment of the plaintiffs remaining claim, and litigation is almost inevitable.
In recent years the plaintiffs' bar has complained that overloaded court
dockets and the resulting delay in the judicial process cause great hardship
to their clients. This contention has merit. As one writer stated, "[tlhere
have been instances where the sponge has been thrown in on a meritorious
case simply because the litigant did not have the wherewithal to see it
51. See Michael, supra note 48, at 524.
52. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
53. See, Comment, supra note 15, at 489, in which promoting partial settlements is
questioned as a worthwhile goal.
54. See TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971) (superseded in negligence
cases by TEx. REv. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978)). See notes 132-46
infra and accompanying text for a discussion of pro rata contribution under article 2212 and
comparative contribution under article 2212a, and their effect on Mary Carter agreements.
55. Even in common law jurisdictions where contribution is not permitted, the settling
defendant may be joined under proper circumstances for implied indemnity. See, e.g., Cul-
len v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 211 Kan. 368, 507 P.2d 353 (1973).
56. See Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973); Michael,
supra note 48, at 525.
57. This is essentially the agreement made by the parties in Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev.
402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
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through.""8 Some courts, recognizing this dilemma, have upheld the va-
lidity of the Mary Carter agreement as a device that "puts the plaintiff in
funds" to aid him in time of need and to help finance the litigation against
the remaining defendants.59 A partial settlement will no doubt provide
relief to an injured plaintiff, but the plaintiffs financial needs, assuming
he has been wrongly injured, cannot justify denying the nonsettling de-
fendant a fair trial.6°
While "putting the plaintiff in funds" is superficially appealing, this fac-
tor is rarely the plaintiffs true motive for entering a Mary Carter agree-
ment.61 The real attraction to a Mary Carter arrangement is the ability to
enlist support from the settling defendant and disguise him as an adver-
sary, when he is actually a member of the plaintiffs camp. Justice Tray-
nor's dissent in Pellett v. Sonotone Corp.62 accurately stated the plaintiffs
genuine incentive to enter a Mary Carter agreement. In Pellett the plain-
tiff purchased a hearing aid from the defendant Sonotone Corporation. A
salesman for Sonotone employed defendant Compton, a dentist, to make a
plaster mold of plaintiffs ear so the hearing aid could be properly fitted.
Compton failed to remove all the plaster from the plaintiffs ear, and he
subsequently suffered hearing damage. After instituting an action against
both Sonotone and Compton, the plaintiff entered into a Mary Carter
agreement with Compton.63 In analyzing the purpose and effect of the
agreement, Justice Traynor stated:
It is apparent that plaintiff was interested in maintaining the outward
appearance of a law-suit against Compton in order to get Compton's
testimony as a presumably hostile witness to prove Compton's negli-
gence and to make Sonotone responsible for that negligence. Hence
the agreement that in substance provided that Compton's testimony
would not make him responsible to plaintiff. This scheme made the
action against Compton a collusive proceeding. . . . [P]laintiff ex-
pected by this agreement to secure favorable testimony from
58. Scoby, Loan Receipts and Guaranty Agreements, 10 FORUM 1300, 1314 (1975).
59. See Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973); Grillo v.
Burke's Paint Co., 275 Ore. 445, 551 P.2d 449 (1976).
60. One commentator has stated:
The solution to [the plaintiffs pre-trial financial] problem does not lie in gim-
mickry or in the encouragement of litigation against collateral defendants who
will loan the plaintiff enough of a warchest to pursue the cause against the
putative 'real' culprit. The cost to the integrity of the judicial process is too
high.
Scobey, supra note 58, at 1314-15.
61. The settling defendant in many Mary Carter agreements does not advance money to
the plaintiff, but merely guarantees payment should the plaintiff fail to recover a stipulated
sum from the nonsettling defendant. In these cases the "putting the plaintiff in funds"
argument is totally without merit. See, e.g., City of Tucson v. Gallagher, 14 Ariz. App. 385,
483 P.2d 798 (1971), vacated, 108 Ariz. 140, 493 P.2d 1197 (1972).
62. 26 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945).
63. The agreement was not technically a Mary Carter agreement, but the collusive as-
pects of the compact are obvious. The plaintiff agreed not to execute judgment against
Compton in return for 10 dollars if a judgment would be entered in favor of the plaintiff
against the "defendant in said action," and five dollars regardless of the outcome. These
sums are meager at best, even by 1945 standards. Of more importance, however, was
Compton's continued participation in the trial. Id. at 785-86.
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Compton . . . and that Compton's true performance was to be the
giving of favorable testimony. Since the contract could not set forth
such an immoral consideration it was predicated on the agreement
that Compton is not guilty of culpable conduct.6 4
Mary Carter agreements have likewise been noted for rewarding the de-
fendant willing to settle with the opportunity to avoid liability com-
pletely. 65 This result is socially desirable only when the settling defendant
is not at fault.6 6 A basic premise of tort law is that a wrongdoer should
compensate the injured party for his injuries. A defendant who has
wronged the plaintiff should not be permitted to escape liability by wager-
ing on the plaintiffs success against the remaining defendant, and then
stack the deck against the nonsettling defendant by aiding the plaintiffs
cause. This adjudicative gambling breeds collusion and deception, and
erodes the integrity of the judicial system.
III. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE AGREEING PARTIES AND THE RESULTING
PREJUDICE ON THE NONSETTLING DEFENDANT
The objectives of the plaintiff and the settling defendant are altered dra-
matically upon entering a Mary Carter agreement. The incentive clause
insures that a substantial verdict against the remaining defendant will ben-
efit both parties.67 Thus, the plaintiff and settling defendant, through var-
ious tactical devices, patronize one another's position. The jury, unaware
of the reason for this transition in posture, is misled, and the nonsettling
defendant is denied a fair and impartial trial.
In order to highlight further the potential prejudice caused by such
agreements, an examination of the objectives of the plaintiff and the set-
tling defendant is required. To accomplish their purpose the agreeing
parties must obtain the following: (1) a finding of negligence on the part
of the nonsettling defendant; (2) a finding of no negligence on the part of
the plaintiff;6" (3) a finding of no negligence on the part of the settling
defendant if the jurisdiction provides pro rata or comparative contribution
among joint tortfeasors; 69 and (4) a sufficiently large verdict for both
64. Id. at 789.
65. See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 778; Michael, supra note 48, at 525.
66. The plaintiff, however, is usually more anxious to enter a Mary Carter agreement
with the more blameworthy defendant, since he will be willing to guarantee more money to
the plaintiff. Mary Carter agreements, thus, tend to shift the burden of liability to the less
culpable party. See Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973)
(dissenting opinion); see also Comment, supra note 26, at 231 (1976).
67. See notes 88-93 infra and accompanying text.
68. This objective must be satisfied in jurisdictions where plaintiffs recovery will be
barred by any degree of contributory negligence. The plaintiffs recovery in jurisdictions
controlled by comparative negligence is decreased in proportion to his negligence, although
recovery can be denied completely if the plaintiffs negligence is equal to or exceeds (de-
pending on the type of comparative negligence statute) the total negligence of the defend-
ants. A finding that the plaintiff is not negligent, in either instance, however, is beneficial to
the mutual goal of the plaintiff and settling defendant. See Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 1 (1974), for a discussion of the Texas Comparative Negligence
Statute, TEx. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978).
69. Assuming the nonsettling defendant seeks contribution from the settling defendant,
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parties to benefit by the terms of the incentive clause.
Even in the absence of a Mary Carter agreement it is not unusual that
the plaintiff and the settling defendant would both try to establish the first
objective: the negligence of the nonsettling defendant. There is no rule
that defendants must be allies against the plaintiff on the question of the
defendants' liability." When the negligence of the plaintiff is at issue,
however, it would seem extraordinarily uncommon for a codefendant to
concede the contributory negligence question. Yet the settling defendants
in Ponderosa Timber & Clearing Co. v. Emrich7 used this very method to
assure a judgment for the plaintiff. In an action seeking recovery for inju-
ries sustained in an automobile collision, all four defendants entered de-
fenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. After the first
day of trial, however, the plaintiff and two of the defendants entered a
Mary Carter agreement. The following statement, taken from the closing
argument of counsel for the settling defendants, clearly indicates where his
sentiments lay:
'Mr. Shamberger [counsel for the nonsettling defendants] explained
that the defendants were relying on two defenses, contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk.'
'Now I am not going to stand here and make a fool of myself by
telling you people that there is any merit in the defense of contribu-
tory negligence. There isn't. Even though that was asserted in the
defenses here, as far as I am concerned, you can forget about that.
You heard no instruction on assumption of risk. So the second side of
this case, if there was a second side, is out of the case, too.'
'This is the kind of a case when a lawyer. . . has to remind
himself of the oath that he took when he was admitted to practice...
to see that justice is done ... ,72
The Supreme Court of Nevada, over a vigorous dissent,73 denied the
nonsettling defendants' motion for new trial.74 The majority apparently
believed that even though the jury was not aware of the Mary Carter
the plaintiffs recovery under comparative contribution will be diminished by the percentage
of the settling defendant's negligence. The plaintiffs recovery under pro rata contribution
will be diminished in proportion to the number of defendants found liable. See notes 119-
46 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of contribution among joint
tortfeasors on Mary Carter agreements.
70. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
71. 86 Nev. 625, 472 P.2d 358 (1970).
72. 472 P.2d at 362-63 (emphasis added).
73. The dissent noted that the nonsettling defendants,
as co-defendants, had every right to rely upon the position of [the settling
defendants] as expressed in their pleadings, which asserted the affirmative de-
fense of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Indeed, NRCP 11
provides, in part: 'The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading [and] that to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion and belief there is good ground to support it .....
Id. at 363.
74. The majority insisted that it was not improper for the settling defendants to aban-
don their defenses. Such action is just "a matter of trial strategy." Id. at 360. A "strate-
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agreement, the false posture of the settling parties did not affect the out-
come of the case.7 5 It is startling that the court could make such a finding
since the defendants had settled their dispute with the plaintiff prior to
abandoning their defenses and, thus, would benefit financially from a
judgment against the remaining defendants.76 Favorable statements by
defense counsel toward the plaintiffs case and against his own client's ap-
parent interest may be weighed heavily by the jury. Simple logic would
reason that such statements would be a determinative factor in finding for
the plaintiff. The Nevada Supreme Court, however, reconsidered the po-
sition taken in Ponderosa Timber one year later in Lum v. Stinnett77 and
became one of two jurisdictions to declare Mary Carter agreements against
public policy and void.78
In jurisdictions where pro rata or comparative contribution among joint
tortfeasors is in effect, a finding of negligence on the part of the settling
defendant will reduce the plaintiffs possible recovery. 79  In such a juris-
diction the parties to the agreement try to absolve the settling defendant of
liability. In contrast to his normal role in the adversary context, the plain-
tiff in furtherance of the Mary Carter agreement may assume a posture
much like that of a settling defendant who abandons his defenses.8" At
some point toward the end of the trial, the plaintiff may concede to the
jury that the settling defendant is not negligent,8 ' or the plaintiff may dis-
miss the settling defendant at the close of the evidence. An instructive case
is Lum v. Stinnett,82 a malpractice action against three doctors. The plain-
tiff entered a Mary Carter agreement with Drs. Greene and Romeo and
retained his cause of action against Dr. Lum. While Romeo was the
gic" move such as this, however, ought to be made before trial. Withdrawing contributory
negligence at trial would appear to be nothing more than an overt act of admitting liability.
75. Id.
76. The agreement essentially provided that: (1) if plaintiffs lost at trial or obtained
judgment only against the settling defendants, the settling defendants would pay $20,000; (2)
if the plaintiffs obtained a judgment against any of the nonsettling defendants for less than
$20,000, the settling defendant would pay the difference between the judgment and $20,000;
and (3) if the plaintiff obtained a judgment against any of the nonsettling defendants for
more than $20,000, the settling defendants would pay nothing. Id. at 359.
77. 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971). See notes 83-85 infra and accompanying text for
a discussion of this case.
78. The Wisconsin Supreme Court invalidated Mary Carter agreements in Trampe v.
Wisconsin Tel. Co., 214 Wis. 210, 252 N.W. 675 (1934). This decision, however, may limit
invalidation to instances where the settling parties secreted the agreement.
79. See notes 133-46 infra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text.
81. Admittedly, there are no reported cases showing this exact situation, largely because
pro rata contribution is a reasonably effective deterrent to entering Mary Carter agreements.
Comparative contribution is such a new concept that the law has not had time to develop in
this area. See notes 119-46 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of
contribution among joint tortfeasors on Mary Carter agreements. Picture as an example,
however, plaintiffs counsel graciously admitting to the jury that he made a mistake suing
the settling defendant; that the action against the settling defendant was a product of over-
caution; that, in truth, the nonsettling defendant was the culprit. A jury would probably
place considerable weight on this statement, although such candor is falsely premised since
the plaintiff has actually settled his dispute with this defendant.
82. 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
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prime target of the complaint, the plaintiff virtually disregarded Greene
and Romeo after the agreement was made.8 3  In contrast to the placid
attitude taken by counsel for the settling defendants, Lum's counsel's vig-
orous defense must have suggested that only Lum had cause for concern.
This inference could only have been strengthened when the plaintiff dis-
missed Romeo and Green at the close of the evidence.84
The collusive tactics of the agreeing parties take on a somewhat different
flavor in no contribution and pro tanto contribution jurisdictions, where
the settling defendant's negligence does not affect the recovery.85 There
have been occasions in these jurisdictions when the settling defendant ad-
mitted liability to the jury in closing argument.86 The settling defendant
usually continues this philanthropic candor by admitting negligence on the
part of the other defendant as well.87
In an action based on joint and several liability, the posture of the vari-
ous defendants may vary on the liability issue. In all circumstances, how-
ever, a defendant who may be jointly and severally liable will deny or at
least try to mitigate damages. This cooperation vanishes when the settling
defendant enters a Mary Carter agreement because the settling defendant's
liability under a Mary Carter arrangement will be diminished proportion-
ately as the size of the plaintiffs verdict is increased.88 In this situation
the settling defendant usually will not contest the plaintiffs damages 89 or
83. 488 P.2d at 348.
84. Id. at 349.
85. If pro tanto contribution is in effect, the plaintiffs recovery will be diminished only
by the amount paid for the covenant not to sue. The settling defendant's negligence, thus, is
of no consequence. The settling defendant's negligence is likewise of no relevance in states
that do not permit contribution. The plaintiff in no contribution jurisdictions will execute
the judgment solely against the nonsettling defendant, and the settling defendant is immune
from any subrogation efforts by the nonsettling defendant.
86. See Ponderosa Timber & Clearing Co. v. Emrick, 86 Nev. 625, 472 P.2d 358, 362
(1970); Degen v. Bayman, 86 S.D. 598, 200 N.W.2d 134, 139 (1972).
87. The closing argument of counsel for the settling defendants in Ponderosa Timber &
Clearing Co. v. Emrich, 86 Nev. 625, 472 P.2d 358 (1970), is again illustrative:
I submit to you ladies and gentlemen there aren't three sides to this case, there
aren't even two sides, there is one side, and that side is that all of these defend-
ants are responsible to the plaintiff and I consider it my duty as an officer of
this court to suggest to you that in the interest of justice, if we are to have
justice in this case, there must be a plaintiffs verdict against all of the defend-
ants.
Id. at 362.
88. See notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text. The situation in City of Tucson v.
Gallagher, 108 Ariz. 140, 493 P.2d 1197 (1972), illustrates the contrast in the settling defend-
ant's position on liability and damages. The court noted that:
In the absence of the arrangement, [the settling defendant's] defense would
have been based upon a showing that he was not negligent, and that the acci-
dent was caused solely by the city's negligence. He had the same identical
motives after the agreement was made. The only difference is that he would
be motivated in seeing that any judgment obtained by the plaintiff against the
city would exceed $10,000.
493 P.2d at 1199-1200.
89. See id.; Bill Currie Ford, Inc. v. Cash, 252 So. 2d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971). In
the latter case, the settling defendant failed to cross-examine the plaintiffs medical wit-
nesses. The court noted that there is no duty on the part of the settling defendant to keep
the verdict at a minimum through cross-examination of the plaintiff s doctors. Perhaps,
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will overtly demonstrate that the plaintiff has been injured and deserves a
substantial damage award. The closing statement by counsel for the set-
tling defendant in Degen v. Bayman9 ° is illustrative of this last point.
I have no doubt, ladies and gentlemen, that in this case you're going
to give Billy Degen a verdict and believe me, in this argument and
particularly in a case like this, I think the attorneys have a real re-
sponsibility to be candid with the jury, and I'm trying to be with you
because this is a very serious case.
There isn't any doubt in my mind but what you're going to give
Billy Degen a verdict. There isn't any doubt in my mind that it's
going to be a substantial one.9
The jury, unaware of counsel's motivation in making this statement, may
accept this astonishing admission of liability and damages at face value.92
These examples are not the exclusive means by which the nonsettling
defendant is prejudiced. The agreeing parties, ostensibly adverse, are able
to employ evidentiary tactics to their advantage. Counsel may lead ad-
verse witnesses, thus permitting the settling defendant to lead and control
plaintiffs witnesses, and permitting the plaintiff to do likewise with the
settling defendant's witnesses. 93 On cross-examination the friendly parties
are also able to correct errors and omissions made by each other on direct
examination. For example, plaintiffs counsel in Lum v. Stinnett94 failed
to ask plaintiffs former employer if plaintiff had received tips as well as
wages. The settling defendant's counsel obligingly elicited this informa-
tion from the witness on cross-examination. 95
Perhaps the most misleading factor to the jury is the degeneration of the
adversary nature of the trial. The jurors, expecting to see plaintiff versus
defendants, are confused by the benevolent and nonchalant attitude of the
plaintiff and settling defendant toward one another. This deceptive pos-
ture tends to shift the apparent liability to the nonsettling defendant, who
may or may not deserve it.
IV. THE TEXAS SOLUTION: ADMITTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT INTO
EVIDENCE
The events in General Motors Corp. v. Simmons,9 6 which produced the
first Mary Carter agreement to reach a Texas appellate court,97 illustrate a
there is no such "duty," but it cannot be denied that such a nonchalant attitude by one
defendant will unfairly affect the jury's evaluation of damages.
90. 86 S.D. 598, 200 N.W.2d 134 (1972).
91. 200 N.W.2d at 139.
92. See Ponderosa Timber & Clearing Co. v. Emrich, 86 Nev. 625, 472 P.2d 358 (1970),
in which the settling defendant's counsel admitted special damages in excess of $15,000,
leaving the general damage assessment to the jury. It should be noted that the settling
defendant in Ponderosa would escape liability if the judgment was over $20,000.
93. See Comment, supra note 29, at 1401.
94. 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
95. 488 P.2d at 349.
96. 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
97. There are Texas cases involving assignment of a cause of action, dismissal, or settle-
ment that border on collusion. But these agreements are distinguishable from Mary Carter
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typical Mary Carter scenario. Curtis Simmons's 1962 Chevrolet was in-
volved in a collision with a truck owned by Feld Truck Leasing Corpora-
tion and operated by its employee Hestle Johnston. The impact of the
collision caused Simmons's car window to shatter, and Simmons was
blinded by glass fragments. Contending that the glass in his automobile
was defective, Simmons brought an action alleging product liability and
negligence per se against General Motors Corporation. Simmons also
sued Feld Truck Leasing Corporation and Johnston, alleging that John-
ston negligently collided with Simmons's car. Feld and Johnston brought a
third party action against General Motors for indemnity, and General Mo-
tors in turn sought contribution from Feld and Johnston.
Feld and Johnston entered a Mary Carter agreement with Simmons, ac-
knowledging that Feld and Johnston had paid Simmons an undisclosed
amount of money in return for Simmons's covenant not to sue. The
agreement contained an incentive clause whereby Feld could recover as
much as $200,000 from a successful prosecution of Simmons's case against
General Motors.98 The agreement also prevented Simmons from settling
with General Motors without the consent of Feld.99 Feld and Johnston
subsequently participated in the trial as first party defendants, notwith-
standing the settlement agreement."° The agreement, however, was made
known to all counsel well before trial, and a copy of the agreement was
filed with the court.'°' The jury, nonetheless, was not instructed that Sim-
mons had settled his claim against Feld and Johnston, nor was the jury
informed that Feld had a vested financial interest in the success of Sim-
mons's action against General Motors.10 2 The jury was told on several
occasions that there was "no adversity or diversity of interest" between
agreements. See, e.g., McMullen v. Coleman, 135 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1940, no writ); Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 94, 84 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1935, opinion adopted).
98. The relevant portions of the agreement follow:
3. In the event the parties to this agreement are successful in their prosecu-
tion of their causes of action against General Motors and a judgment is ren-
dered against General Motors for money damages, and thereafter paid, Feld
Truck Leasing Corporation will be entitled to and will receive from the pro-
ceeds of such judgment fifty (50%) percent of each dollar recovered, up to
$200,000.00. In no event shall Feld Truck Leasing Corporation be entitled to
recover under this agreement more than $200,000.00. All sums not attributa-
ble to Feld Truck Leasing Corporation under this agreement shall be payable
to and the property of plaintiff, Curtis Lee Simmons and his attorneys.
4. Both Curtis Lee Simmons and Feld Truck Leasing Corporation and
Hestle Andrew Johnston, Jr. shall bear their own attorneys fees and litigation
expense and neither party shall have any financial responsibility for the attor-
neys fees or litigation expense incurred by the other party.
5. No settlement of the causes of action against General Motors will be ef-
fected without the joint consent of all parties to this agreement.
558 S.W.2d at 855.
99. Id.
100. 545 S.W.2d 502, 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976), rev'd, 558 S.W.2d
855 (Tex. 1977).
101. Post Submission Brief for Respondent at , General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558
S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
102. 545 S.W.2d at 516.
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plaintiff Simmons and defendants Feld and Johnston. 0 3
Counsel for the agreeing parties in Simmons were clearly not attempting
to deceive the court by concealing the agreement.' °4 Nonetheless, the
Mary Carter agreement altered the posture of the parties and induced
counsel for Feld and Johnston to promote Simmons's cause of action
against General Motors. Counsel for Feld and Johnston took an active
role in the damages dispute, made an extensive effort to establish that Sim-
mons was totally blind,0 5 and on another occasion, attempted to evoke
sympathy for the plaintiff."°6 These gestures by counsel were inexplicable
.103. Id. at 516-17. Plaintiffs counsel stated to the jury on voir dire examination: "This
is a lawsuit against General Motors primarily, and only, as far as plaintiff is concerned. This
is a suit seeking money damages and a great deal of money damages against General Motors
Corporation which they have inflicted through their product on Mr. Curtis Lee Simmons."
Id. at 516. Counsel for General Motors stated to the jury that "[tihere is no adversity of
interest between plaintiff, Mr. Simmons, and his lawyers and Feld Truck Leasing and Hestle
Andrew Johnston, Jr., and their lawyers." Id. at 517.
104. See, e.g., Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 358 (W.D. La. 1976) in
which the Mary Carter agreement was not disclosed until after trial. See also notes 39-44
supra and accompanying text for a discussion of secrecy as an element of Mary Carter
agreements.
105. In cross-examining Dr. Louis Girard, who had stated unequivocally that Simmons
was not totally disabled by his eye problems and who had also cast some doubt on Sim-
mons's efforts to seek medical aid for his alleged discomfort and continuing handicap, coun-
sel for Feld and Johnston asked the following questions:
Q: Now, Doctor, during the five months that you were seeing Curtis Lee
Simmons, he was making every effort as you could observe to make a
maximum recovery, was he not?
A: He was.
Q: He was making every effort insofar as you could observe to rehabilitate
himself was he not?
A: He was.
Q: During the time of the time that you saw him and the condition or the
time that the photophobia was noted in your records, on that occasion at
least the photophobia was one hundred percent genuine was it not?
A: I believe it was.
Q: And it certainly is fair to say, sir, is it not, that you have no evidence, no
solid medical evidence of any kind to tell us today that if Mr. Simmons
has symptoms of photophobia, that those symptoms are anything less
than one hundred percent genuine? You have no evidence to that effect?
A: I have not examined him since the latter part of November of '73, so I
have no idea.
Q: And also in answer to my question you have no evidence, that is, symp-
toms of photophobia, today if he complains of them, they are not genuine
to you?
A: I have no idea.
Q: And no evidence?
A: And no evidence.
Q: All right.
Brief for Appellant at 29-30, General Motors Corp v. Simmons, 545 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976), rev'd, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
106. Counsel for Feld and Johnston asked the following questions to plaintiff Simmons
on cross-examination:
Q: Mr. Simmons, you were present and you heard Dr. Girard's testimony, I
guess, did you not, sir?
A: I heard his testimony, yes sir.
Q: Directing your attention to his testimony about water skiing and snow
skiing and going to the beach without sunglasses and flying airplanes
would you like to do those things if you could?
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without knowledge of the Mary Carter agreement.
The Texas Supreme Court reasoned that informing the jury that Sim-
mons was not "adverse" to Feld and Johnston was not a sufficient expla-
nation of the true alignment of the parties. The court noted that by the
terms of the agreement, "Feld acquired a direct financial interest in Sim-
mons's lawsuit. The financial interest of the parties and witnesses in the
success of a party is a proper subject of disclosure by direct evidence or
cross-examination."' 7 The court concluded that exclusion of the settle-
ment agreement was harmful error and remanded the case for trial.'
The court, however, failed to set guidelines establishing when and for
what purposes a Mary Carter agreement may be admitted in evidence.
An unresolved problem is whether a Mary Carter agreement may be ad-
mitted only to impeach a witness or party, or whether it may also be ad-
mitted to show the true alignment of the parties. °9 Determining what
portions of the agreement should be disclosed to the jury is equally un-
clear. The trial may prove more unfair to the litigants if the agreement is
admitted in toto than if the agreement is withheld. The parties to the
agreement may load the document with self-serving statements and preju-
dicial comments about the nonsettling defendant. The agreement may
proclaim that the nonsettling defendant is the negligent party,"0 that the
nonsettling defendant has irresponsibly refused to negotiate a settle-
ment,111 or that the plaintiff's damages are a specified sum, usually the
A: I would love to, sir.
Q. Can you?
A: No, sir; I can't.
Id. at 31.
107. 558 S.W.2d at 857. In a recent Texas case involving a Mary Carter agreement, the
agreeing parties contended that their agreement was not a true Mary Carter agreement be-
cause the settling defendant's insurance carrier advanced the funds to the plaintiff, and this
sum was to be repaid to the insurer out of any recovery from the nonsettling defendant.
Although the settling defendant did not personally retain a financial interest in the lawsuit,
the Texas Supreme Court refused to distinguish this agreement from the Simmons agree-
ment. The court noted that the payment was made on behalf of the settling defendant, and
therefore, the settling defendant and the insurer should stand in the same shoes. Bristol-
Meyers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978).
108, 558 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1977). The traditional rule is that settlement agreements are
not admissible to show an admission of liability or an admission against interest. A con-
trary rule would thwart the policy favoring out of court settlements. See McGuire v. Com-
mercial Union Ins. Co., 431 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1968); Skyline Cab Co. v. Bradley, 325 S.W.2d
176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court, in ordering admittance of
the Mary Carter agreement, relied on Trinity County Lumber Co. v. Denham, 88 Tex. 203,
30 S.W. 856 (1895) and Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Watson, 491 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1973, writ refd n.r.e.). Settlement agreements in these cases were prop-
erly revealed on cross-examination of a witness to show interest, prejudice, or bias.
109. In Simmons, for example, Feld was the only defendant who could profit by the
Mary Carter arrangement, and he did not testify at the trial. Johnston was the only defend-
ant to testify, and he had no financial interest in the lawsuit. Johnston was no longer an
employee of Feld at the time of the trial, so there was no foundation for impeachment of
Johnston by the Mary Carter agreement. Motion for Rehearing Brief for Respondent at 3-
4, General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
110. See, e.g., Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., 355 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. App. 1976); Lum v.
Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
111. See Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
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amount prayed for in the complaint. 1 2 The jury would be informed of
the amount of the settlement if an unedited version of the agreement were
admitted. This information could be prejudicial to any of the parties, de-
pending on the size of the settlement. If the agreement indicates that a
nominal or "nuisance" settlement has been made with one defendant, the
nonsettling defendant can use this fact to downgrade the plaintiffs claim.
If the settlement reveals that a substantial payment has been made, the
nonsettling defendant would likely urge that the agreement proves that the
settling defendant was the party responsible for the injury, and that he has
already paid the damages."l 3  This potential prejudice prompted the
South Dakota Supreme Court to declare that under no circumstances
should the amount of the settlement be disclosed to the jury."
14
Deleting the amount of the settlement and any self-serving statements
that may be present, however, may not preclude the prejudicial impact of
the agreement. If counsel attempts to impeach a witness through the
existence of a Mary Carter agreement, the prejudicial elements of the
agreement, such as the amount of the settlement, may inadvertently be
disclosed to the jury." 5 The mere fact that a settlement has been made
may cause the jury to believe that the plaintiff has received full satisfaction
of his claim" 6 or that the responsible party has already come forward,
regardless of whether the plaintiff has received full satisfaction." 7 The
existence of a settlement, on the other hand, "may suggest to the jury that
at least one defendant feels that the plaintiff should recover and [that] the
nonagreeing defendants should pay.""' 8  In instances where there are
multiple plaintiffs and only one plaintiff has entered a Mary Carter agree-
ment, disclosure to the jury of an edited form of the agreement could sub-
stantially prejudice the nonsettling plaintiff.
The thought processes of twelve jurors are difficult to predict. But ad-
mitting a Mary Carter agreement into evidence will unquestionably
prejudice one of the parties to the lawsuit in the eyes of a jury. The un-
known factor is which of the parties will be prejudiced by the agreement.
A jury will draw conclusions from a pretrial settlement, and they may not
always be correct conclusions. Thus, disclosing Mary Carter agreements
to the jury is an unsuitable means of dealing with these collusive settle-
ment devices.
112. See Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., 355 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. App. 1976); Lum v. Stin-
nett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
113. Degen v. Bayman, 86 S.D. 598, 200 N.W.2d 134, 138 (1972).
114. 200 N.W.2d at 139.
115. See Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
116. See Note, supra note 26, at 800.
117. Bedford School Dist. v. Caron Constr. Co., 116 N.H. 300, 367 A.2d 1051 (1976).
118. 367 A.2d at 1054.
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V. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DEALING WITH MARY CARTER
AGREEMENTS
Contribution Under the Uniform Acts of 1939 and 1955. A plaintiff, under
common law principles, could execute his entire judgment against any
joint and severally liable defendant, and that defendant was precluded
from seeking contribution from his fellow tortfeasors." 9 The belief that
joint tortfeasors should bear their share of liability has led to the adoption
of contribution statutes in nearly three-quarters of the states.12° The vari-
ous states, however, have adopted surprisingly different rules as to how
contribution should be enforced.' Several states have enacted either the
1939 or 1955 version of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors Act.' 2 2 Section four of the 1939 Act provides that the claim
against the nonsettling defendant will be diminished by the amount paid
for the settlement or any other amount specified in the release.123 Section
five, which was adopted to prevent collusion among the settling parties, 124
permits the nonsettling defendant to obtain pro rata contribution from the
settling defendant. 25  Partial settlements, collusive or not, are virtually
eliminated under the 1939 Act since a defendant will rarely settle with the
plaintiff if he is still subject to an action for pro rata contribution by the
remaining defendant. The 1939 Act precludes the formal use of Mary
Carter agreements, 126 but at the expense of barring noncollusive partial
119. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 307.
120. Comment, supra note 29, at 1403.
121. Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. 1964).
122. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT (1955).
123. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4 (1939):
Release; Effect on Injured Person's Claim-A release by the injured person of
one joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment does not discharge the
other tortfeasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against
the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or
in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim
shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.
Reducing the recovery by the amount paid for the settlement is termed pro tanto reduction.
124. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 5, Commissioners' Note
(1939).
125. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 5 (1939):
Release; Effect on Right of Contribution-A release by the injured person of
one joint tortfeasor does not relieve him from liability to make contribution to
another joint tortfeasor unless the release is given before the right of the other
tortfeasor to secure a money judgment for contribution has accrued, and pro-
vides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of the released
tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable against all the other
tortfeasors.
126. The 1955 Commissioners' Note indicates that the 1939 Act did not prevent collusive
settlements:
Reports from the state[s] where the [1939] Act is adopted appear to agree that
it has accomplished nothing in preventing collusion. In most three-party
cases two parties join hands against the third, and this occurs even when the
case goes to trial against both defendants. 'Gentlemen's agreements' are still
made among lawyers, and the formal release is not at all essential to them. If
the plaintiff wishes to discriminate as to the defendants, the 1939 provision
does not prevent him from doing so.
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4, Commissioners' Note (1955).
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settlements.
The unsatisfactory effect of the 1939 Act' 27 led to its revision in 1955.
Sections four and five of the original act were amended and combined into
section four of the 1955 Act. 128 The plaintiffs recovery under the revised
act is reduced pro tanto if the settlement is in "good faith."'129  Unlike the
1939 Act, however, the nonsettling defendant may not seek contribution
from the released party. 130  The explanation of the 1955 revision in the
Commissioners' Note recognized that it was more important to encourage
settlement than to attempt to prevent collusion in lawsuits.' 3' The 1955
revision, by not permitting pro rata contribution, seems to permit the exact
collusive tactics the 1939 Act tried to eliminate. One writer, however, has
noted that the 1955 Act requirement of a good faith settlement may ex-
clude Mary Carter agreements. 132  This proposition is certainly compati-
ble with the views expressed in this Comment; however, the nebulous
standard of "good faith" may not be sufficient protection against collusive
settlements.
Pro Rata Contribution in Texas. Article 2212 of the Texas Revised Civil
Statutes 33 gives a party the right to seek pro rata contribution from any
codefendant against whom a judgment is entered in an action based on
tort, although the statute makes no provision for contribution when the
127. Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 769 (Tex. 1964).
128. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4 (1955):
Release or Covenant Not to Sue-When a release or a covenant not to sue or
not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons
liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the
injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim
against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the
covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the
greater; and,
(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
contribution to any other tortfeasor.
129. Id. If the settlement is made in bad faith, the nonsettling defendant may be enti-
tled to pro rata contribution from the settling defendant.
130. Id.
131. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4, Commissioners' Note
(1955).
132. Comment, supra note 29, at 1406-07. The nonsettling defendant, however, has the
burden of proving the settlement was not made in good faith.
133. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971). This statute was superseded
by the Texas Comparative Negligence and Contribution Statute in 1973. TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978). Article 2212 is still relevant in Texas, however,
since cases are still pending which arose before the September 1, 1973, effective date of
article 221 2a.
The Texas Supreme Court in General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.
1977), noted that comparative contribution under art. 2212a is not appropriate between neg-
ligent tortfeasors and strictly liable tortfeasors; rather, pro rata contribution under art. 2212
is the proper means to apportion damages in such cases. Article 2212a applies only to actions
based on "negligence," and, as the court noted, art. 2212a "nowhere uses the term 'strict
liability.'" 558 S.W.2d at 862. Article 2212, on the other hand, contemplates pro rata con-
tribution in "an action arising out of, or based on tort." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212
(Vernon 1971). Thus, pro rata contribution would seem statutorily mandated between a
strictly liable tortfeasor and a negligent tortfeasor.
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plaintiff has settled his cause of action against one of the tortfeasors. The
Texas Supreme Court, however, held in Palestine Contractors, Inc. v.
Perkins 34 that when one of two negligent joint tortfeasors settles with the
plaintiff, the plaintiff's claim against the remaining defendant is automati-
cally reduced on a pro rata basis.'
35
The pro rata reduction rule insures the finality guaranteed the settling
defendant in the 1955 Act, enforces the policy of equity among tortfeasors
provided in the 1939 Act, 136 and deters collusive settlements.1 37 A plain-
tiff will generally not enter a Mary Carter agreement when his total recov-
ery could be reduced on a pro rata basis if the settling defendant were
found liable in a contribution action. On the other hand, the plaintiff may
believe that enlisting the support of one defendant will produce the maxi-
mum possible recovery, notwithstanding pro rata reduction. Contribution
may be completely avoided if the plaintiff concludes that, by mutual effort
of the agreeing parties, liability can be shifted entirely to the nonsettling
defendant. The plaintiff in General Motors Corp. v. Simmons,' 38 faced
with the possibility of pro rata reduction, was probably motivated by the
last hypothesis. Simmons's claim against General Motors was for install-
ing defective glass in his automobile, while his claim against Feld and
Johnston was based on negligent collision. The plaintiff apparently be-
lieved it was possible to prove that, while the settling defendants Feld and
Johnston were negligent in causing the collision, the sole proximate cause
of plaintiff's injuries was the defective glass. The agreeing parties
amended their pleadings to pursue General Motors as the sole culprit,1 39
and as a result, plaintiff was awarded a $1,000,000 judgment solely against
General Motors."4 In their amended pleadings, however, the settling de-
fendants admitted that Johnston negligently collided with Simmons and
confessed they owed Simmons some payment for his injuries. The Texas
Supreme Court ruled that as a matter of law, General Motors could not be
solely liable, and the verdict was reduced on a pro rata basis to $500,000.
Simmons, nonetheless, clearly illustrates that pro rata reduction does not
eliminate the use of Mary Carter agreements.
Comparative Contribution in Texas. Article 2212a of the Texas Revised
Civil Statutes, 4 ' adopted in 1973, provides for apportionment of damages
134. 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964).
135. If the settling defendant is a party to the primary suit, the nonsettling defendant
must sue for contribution or the plaintiff's recovery cannot be reduced on a pro rata basis.
Skyline Cab Co. v. Bradley, 325 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
136. See Comment, supra note 15, at 486.
137. See, e.g., Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964); Com-
ment, supra note 15, at 486.
138. 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977). The accident in Simmons occurred prior to the effec-
tive date of article 2212a, thus article 2212 was applicable.
139. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 545 S.W.2d 502, 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1976), rev'd, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
140. 558 S.W.2d at 856.
141. TEX. REV. CIw. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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on a comparative basis in actions based on negligence.' 2  The statute
makes specific provisions for instances where the plaintiff has settled his
claim against a joint tortfeasor.143  Section 2(d) is applicable when the
settling party is never joined in the action, " and, therefore, is never appli-
cable to cases involving Mary Carter agreements. If a settling defendant
is joined in the primary suit, however, section 2(e) provides that the per-
centage of his negligence shall be determined, and that portion of the dam-
ages shall be released. 145
Comparative contribution under article 2212a does not have a forceful
effect on the use of Mary Carter agreements. The plaintiff is not faced
with an automatic fifty percent reduction in his recovery if the settling
defendant is found negligent, as in pro rata contribution. The settling de-
fendant's negligence, under comparative contribution, can reduce the
plaintiffs recovery anywhere from one percent to ninety-nine percent.
Although a risk exists that a jury will find the settling defendant to be the
more culpable party, this is not likely. The plaintiff and the settling de-
fendant may employ the tactical measures discussed earlier,' 46 and,
through their mutual efforts, minimize the percentage of negligence attrib-
utable to the settling defendant.
Dismissal and Severance. Since no justiciable issues exist between the
parties entering the Mary Carter agreement, dismissing the settling defend-
ant is appropriate. 147 In states that do not permit contribution and where
no cross-action for implied indemnity is on file, dismissing the settling de-
fendant will frustrate the collusive intentions of the agreeing parties. 48
The solution, however, is not so simple in contribution jurisdictions where
a defendant will invariably file a cross-action for contribution or indem-
nity if a codefendant has entered a Mary Carter agreement. 49 Although
severance of the cross-action may be a solution to the possible prejudice
which arises from the presence of the settling defendant, 5 ° two major
142. Analysis of the application of article 2212a is beyond the scope of this Comment.
For a discussion of article 2212a, see Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw.
L.J. 1 (1974); Comment, Multiparty Litigation in Comparative Negligence. Incomplete Resolu-
tion of Joinder and Settlement Problems, 32 Sw. L.J. 669 (1978); Comment, Comparative
Negligence in Texas, 11 Hous. L. REV. 101 (1973).
143. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, §§ 2(d), (e), (g) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
144. Id. § 2(d). Each remaining defendant is entitled to reduce the amount owed to the
plaintiff in the following manner. The amount the settling defendant paid for his release is
reduced by the percentage of the remaining defendant's negligence, and that total is sub-
tracted from the damages owed to the plaintiff by the remaining defendant.
145. Id. § 2(e).
146. See notes 67-94 supra and accompanying text.
147. See Gatto v. Walgreen Drug Co., 61 Ill. 2d 513, 337 N.E.2d 23 (1974); Note, supra
note 26, at 796.
148. See Note, supra note 26, at 796.
149. The Texas Supreme Court noted in Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801
(Tex. 1978), that the potential prejudice of a Mary Carter arrangement still exists when the
settling defendant remains a party to the suit solely by a cross-action for contribution or
indemnity.
150. A cause of action may be severed at the discretion of the court to prevent prejudice
to a party. TEX. R. Civ. P. 174(b).
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problems are created. First, severance forces the nonsettling defendant to
participate in two separate proceedings, merely because a codefendant en-
tered an unrighteous agreement to avoid liability. Severing a cross-action
for contribution thus may penalize the innocent party. Secondly, the testi-
mony of a joint tortfeasor is generally desirable evidence in joint tort cases.
The settling tortfeasor's testimony, however, will likely favor the plaintiffs
case, and the nonsettling defendant will be permitted to show bias and
prejudice of the settling tortfeasor's testimony by evidence of a prior settle-
ment. 15' For the reasons discussed above, however, admitting a Mary
Carter agreement into evidence is an unacceptable alternative.' 52 Sever-
ance, thus, will lead to multiplicity of suits and, inevitably, admission of
the Mary Carter agreement into evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
Litigants should be encouraged to resolve their disputes out of court,
and should be permitted to do so with as little judicial supervision as possi-
ble. Mary Carter agreements, however, serve no worthwhile function in
our judicial system; they neither simplify complex litigation nor decongest
court dockets. The most unwholesome aspect of Mary Carter agreements,
however, is the potential prejudice to the nonsettling defendant. The tac-
tics of the agreeing parties can place the nonsettling defendant at a disad-
vantage difficult to overcome. The potential for collusion is always
present and is tempered only by the ethical standards of counsel.
The methods that have been adopted to curtail the use and resulting
injustice of Mary Carter agreements are ineffective. Admitting the agree-
ment into evidence will produce uncertain results and may jeopardize the
nonsettling defendant's rights as well as the rights of the plaintiff. Contri-
bution, as Simmons clearly illustrates, is an ineffective deterrent to the use
of Mary Carter agreements. Dismissal and severance are equally unac-
ceptable alternatives. The solutions adopted by Texas and other jurisdic-
tions thus perpetuate use of a settlement device which does not promote
the administration of justice. The only practical solution is to prohibit the
use of Mary Carter agreements.
151. See note 108 supra. See also Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 358
(W.D. La. 1976), in which the court noted that the settling defendants' interest in the lawsuit
was not terminated, even though they were dismissed. The court ordered the terms of the
release made known to the jury so they could properly evaluate the testimony of the released
defendants.
152. See notes 107-18 supra and accompanying text.
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